TRADE LIBERALIZATION: A STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS EFFECT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (AFRICA) by Osei-Nsafoah, Andrea
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
LLM Theses and Essays Student Works and Organizations
1-1-1999
TRADE LIBERALIZATION: A STUDY OF
THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES OF
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND ITS EFFECT ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (AFRICA)
Andrea Osei-Nsafoah
University of Georgia School of Law
TRADE LIBERALIZATION: A STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS
EFFECT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (AFRICA)
by
Andrea Osei-Nsafoah
LLB London Guildhall University 1997
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF LAWS
ATHENS, GEORGIA
1999
1 Lit RY
UNIVERSITY OP GFOPOM
TRADE LIBERALIZATION: A STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
AND ITS EFFECT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (AFRICA)
by
Andrea Osei-Nsafoah
Approved
'-^JM L^X^^ Date 3g fl^ fgg
Major Professor I
Chairman, Reading Committee
Dateafo^ftW
Approved
$N(lU^ LmA j
Graduate Dean
^Jft*,Ls i /9%
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 A Study of Subsidies and the Conflict between Domestic
Programs and the Principles of the General Agreement of Tariffs
and Trade 5
A. Analysis of Subsidies 6
B. Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States 8
C. Analysis of Injun' 9
D. The Agricultural Policies of the EC and US dealing with Subsidization. ... 1
1
E. The GATT rules on agriculture 14
Chapter 2 An Analysis of the Protectionist Measures of the US and EC 19
A. United States Agricultural Production 21
B. United States Farm Policy 22
C. The Burden of Domestic Farm Programs in the US 24
D. Effects of Trade Liberalization 24
E. Border Measures of the European Community 25
F. Price Support System of the CAP 26
G. Co-responsibility Levies 27
H. The Oilseeds Dispute 28
I. Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 32
in
Chapter 3 Analysis of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations 35
A. Introduction to the Uruguay Round 36
B. Analysis of the Round's Provisions of the Uruguay Round
regarding trade in agriculture 38
C. Weakness and Enforcement Difficulties of the Provisions 46
Chapter 4 Multilateral Trade Agreements for Developing Countries 47
A. The Decision on the Most Favourable Nation Treatment 48
B. The Generalized System of Preferences 49
C. The Paradox of the Agreement on Agriculture 51
D. The Lome Convention 53
E. The Banana Trade War 55
Conclusion 64
Biblography 66
INTRODUCTION
Trade in agriculture has been a very important part of international trade. It has
accounted for about 5% of the total exports of the United States and the European
Community but although it consists of such a small percentage of their gross domestic
product there has been substantial protectionist policies by these two trading blocks
which have prevented the trade in agricultural products to advance. The agricultural
trade has been restricted globally through numerous measures and schemes. These are
designed to limit the importation of certain agricultural products into these trading blocks
while subsidizing through various schemes in order to increase and maintain their
respective dominance in world agricultural markets. Measures to restrict trade have
included subsidies and the utilization of internal price support schemes which enable the
sale of cheaper products on world markets. Also there is the use of quota restrictions and
import licenses to restrict the inflow of agricultural products into the United States and
Europe. This is done in order to protect the respective domestic industries from outside
competition.
Despite all these measures the United States in particular has seen a declining
agricultural sector while the European Community has seen its market position
strengthened to become the premier market for products such as oilseeds and wheat.
Billions of dollars per year has been spent by the United States to maintain its agricultural
sector and various Trade and Development Assistance programs promoting its exports
2are in place. Although the United States has seen its market share decline compared to
Europe it is still a force to reckoned with in the field of agricultural production.
Continental Europe has on the other hand been the stronghold of agricultural
protectionism through its Common Agricultural Policy, designed to choke off any foreign
saturation of the European markets while stabilizing and promoting a better standard of
living for its citizens. The European Community has various border measures in place to
restrict importation into the community, mostly adopted under the Common Agricultural
Policy. This also consists of internal support measures which include minimum producer
prices where the community sets by regulation a minimum producer price for which a
commodity is almost always above world prices.
These protectionist policies have had a significant effect on developing countries.
Positively, as a result of all the subsidization there has been cheaper imports into
developing countries especially those that are net food importing countries. However this
has also led to dependency and lack of initiative to attempt greater efficiency in
agricultural production. Also heavy subsidization of products similarly produced by
developing countries has led to the domination of these products by the United States and
European Community.This has prevented developing countries from progressing in the
export of agricultural products such as wheat, sugar and oilseeds.
The trade policies of the United States and Europe have had a significant effect in the
agricultural production of developing countries. Such countries have experienced
restrictions in their exports to developed countries and in some instances, and in other
instances discrimination which breaches the principles laid down in the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade has occurred.
3In areas of production where there is not subsidization it is observed that
multinational companies have heavily invested in developing countries not particularly
for the furtherance of these economies but rather for corporate gains. Multinational
companies have and continue to capitalize on these countries' only means of exports and
thereby play a controlling role over their political, economic and social life.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade promotes free trade but it was originally
contracted in the interest of the United States agricultural community. The European
Community has however over the years exploited the same clauses designed to protect
Unites States farmers and strengthened its economy. Among several factors hindering
development of developing countries is the protectionist activity of the United States and
Europe. Developing countries, particularly those that depend solely on agricultural
exports for their income, have not enjoyed unrestricted access to world markets and this
has contributed to their inability to sustain rapid growth rates. Many developing countries
have felt that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has not served in their interest
in terms of opening up the world markets of which the European and American markets
are the best established.
The purpose of my thesis is to study the various protectionist policies of the European
Union and the United States and to ascertain its effect on developing countries. The
focus of my thesis will be from the perspective of the Agreement of the World Trade
Organization. In the course of this thesis I will deduce that protectionism has limited the
advancement of trade in agriculture and the fundamental principles of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade have often been disregarded. While I propose freer
trade I do not propose the abolition of all barriers to trade since this would lead to the
4vulnerability of domestic markets and saturation of imports at the expense of domestic
production.
Compliance with the Agreement on Agriculture, put forward by the World Trade
Organization will lead to trade liberalization. Through the gradual relaxation of trade
barriers world trade in agriculture will be increased. Developing countries would gain
more access to world markets thereby improving their capacity to trade in agricultural
products which would increase their economic development. Trade will be expanded,
there will not be the need for so much protectionism, GATT rules will be more effective
thereby eliminating the various non -compliance of its principles.
CHAPTER 1
A study of Subsidies and the Conflict between Domestic Programs and the
Principles of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade.
Trade liberalization has been constrained due to the pursuit of protectionist policies by
the European Community and the United States. As a result, access to the major markets
of the world has been restricted and this has contributed to the lack of progress of global
trade in agriculture. Policies of developed countries have had the net effect of interfering
with the free flow of international trade in agricultural products. 1 There has been
encouragement of insulation of domestic markets and producers by the European
Community and the United States. Consequently domestic production in excess of
demand has been encouraged; the surplus either stored or exported onto the international
market." The products are subsidized in order to help compete on the international
markets and the effect of such policies is the curtailment of market access for third
countries.
3
This chapter discusses the nature of subsidies and the general principles of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In analyzing the nature of subsidies I will
'Joseph A. McMahon. Agricultural trade, protectionism and the problems ofdevelopment, 52 3
rd
ed 1995
2
id at 63
3
John Jackson. The World Trading System 122 1 st ed (1989)
6explore how the EC and US organize their domestic laws in order to promote the
subsidization of agricultural products in taking advantage ofGATT deficiencies.
A. Analysis of Subsidies.
A subsidy is a grant of money made by a government in the aid of the promoters of
any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate, or
which is considered a proper subject for government aid. because such purpose is likely
to be of benefit to the public.
4 The most difficult issue relates to the problem of
distinguishing between legitimate government activities on the one hand and trade
distortive subsidies on the other. The theory of efficiency states that ideal economic
conditions prevail when goods are produced at the cheapest price. ~ A subsidy tries to set
off price and production disadvantages and weaknesses and therefore distorts the
equilibrium by misallocating resources. 6
There are two types of subsidies, domestic and export subsidies. A domestic subsidy is
granted to an industry on all of its production of a product. 7 This is done to reduce the
price to lower than that of the same product of imports, and effectively drive out the
import competition. Therefore the subsidy is protectionist . lowering prices and thus
favourable to consumers
9
. An export subsidy by contrast is paid to an industry only on
products that are exported. Consequently goods tend to be sold abroad at a price below
4 The Uruguay Round of Agreement Act 19 U.S.C sec 3571 (1994)
3
Phillip Brown, Modern Economics 4 th ed (1984)
6 OECD Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook, OECD Paris ( 1 988) p94
7
Miguel Figuero, International Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek, 19 N. C.J Intl. L & com.
Reg. 48 (1993)
8
id
9
id
7that of the goods sold in the domestic market. This distorts resource allocation by
inducing production and exportation that is otherwise uneconomic.
An export subsidy is prohibited per se and a domestic subsidy is prohibited but
admissible in instances concerning substantial changes in economic conditions." They
are allowed but not encouraged.
1
" An export subsidy may be defined as any government
program or practice that increases the profitability of export sales but does not similarly
increase the profitability of sales for domestic consumption.
1
" Examples include
government payments to manufacturers that are contingent upon export volume and the
manipulation of market determined exchange rates to favor export sales or production for
export.
14
In addition to this there is the provision of goods or services by the government
for use in the production of exports on more favorable terms than for use in the
production of goods for domestic consumption and a variety of other practices. 1?
Where it can be determined that a product has been subsidized a government can
impose a countervailing duty on the subsidized good. 16 Government subsidies that cannot
be characterized as export subsidies are countervailable under US law only if they fall
within the statutory definition of a domestic subsidy. Virtually any type of government
program can confer a domestic subsidy if it meets two criteria : it must be sufficiently
targeted to a specific enterprise or group of enterprises or industries, and roughly it must
provide some opportunity or advantage to the targeted producers that would not
10
id at 49
G Hufbauer & J Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 1 st ed 24 (1984)
12
id
"id
14
15
John Jackson. Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relation, 3 rd ed. 149 (1995)
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade Annex A to the Subsidies Code is an Illustrative list ofExport
Subsidies. 19U.S.C.A 1677(5) (A)
John Jackson, Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relation, supra at 1 50
8otherwise be available to them in the marketplace.
17
The agricultural sector constitutes of
large group of industries, which have been heavily subsidized. If a national government
finances a program to assist all farmers in the country who require aid. the aid is
potentially countervailable.
18 US law allows only a few adjustments to the subsidy
calculation to reflect taxes or other charges paid to the government by the beneficiaries of
the subsidy program.
19
Offsets are allowed for application fees, deposits or similar
charges in connection with the subsidy program. But the countervailing duty laws will
not look beyond the government program under investigation to calculate net benefits.
B. Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States
The Tariff Act of 1930 section 303" authorizes the Treasury Department to impose
duties on imported merchandise to offset any bounty or grant bestowed upon it. Between
1935 - 1994 there were 24 duties imposed. The Trade Act 1974 made changes to the
statute. It required the Treasury Department to make a preliminary decision within six
months of the filing date of a petition and a final decision within twelve months. The
Trade Agreement Act 1979 implemented the Tokyo Round subsidies code under the US
law. Investigations were transferred from the Treasury Department to the Commerce
Department's International Trade Administration.""
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 U.N.T.S 187 art. VI:6
William T Archy, Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097,25101 (1985)
Tangermann, Approaches to Export Subsidies: Disciplinesfor Export Subsidies in Primary and Non
Primary Products, 55 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 1 12 (1989)
20
id
21
Tariff Act 1930 sec 303, 19 U.S.C 987
22
Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Article V, XVI and XXIII of the GATT, Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents 56 (GATT)
9The Administration proposed a set of regulations for countervailing subsidies but they
were never formally adopted due to the pendency of the Uruguay Round. They are
however regarded as a valuable statement of practice. Section 355.42"
J
provides that a
countervailable subsidy exists where the Secretary determines that:
a) a program provides selective treatement to a product or firm and
b) a program provides a countervailable benefit with respect to the merchandise.
24
Section 355.43 provides that:
a) Export programs. Selective treatment, and a potential countervailable export
subsidy exists where the secretary determines that eligibility for or the amount of benefits
under a program is tied to actual or anticipated export earnings.
b) Where exportation is only one of many eligibility criteria for benefits under a
program, the inclusion of exportation as a criteria shall not per se constitute selective
treatment within the meaning of paragraph *a'.
c) Domestic programs, Selective treatment and a potential countervailable domestic
subsidy exists where the Secretary determines that benefits under a program are provided
or are required to be provided in law or in fact, to a specific enterprise or industry or
group of enterprises."^
In determining whether benefits are specific the Secretary will consider among other
things the following factors:
The extent to which a government acts to limit the availability of a program, the
number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof that actively use the program. A
factor that will be looked at is whether there are dominant users of a program or whether
certain enterprises, industries or groups receive disproportionately larger benefits under
the program. The extent to which a government exercises discretion in conferring
benefits under a program is also considered. 6
C. Analysis of Injury
Before a countervailing duty may be imposed under the General Agreement of Tariffs
and Trade, a country must determine that imports of subsidized merchandize have
' Trade Agreement Act 1979 Department of Commerce, International Trade Commission, 54 Fed. Reg.
23366
24
id
25
id
26
id
10
caused material injury or threatened material injury to the domestic industry producing
the like product of that import and are materially retarding the establishment of a
domestic industry.
The investigation of injury is conducted by the International Trade Commission and
is known as the injury test. The injury test requires the ITC to determine whether the
domestic industry that competes with the imports at issue is materially injured or is
threatened with material injury by reason of the imports that were found to be subsidized
by the ITC." The procedure determines whether unfairly traded imports cause or threaten
material injury or retard the establishment of an industry. Consequently the application
of the injury test requires only two or three stages of analysis. The relevant domestic
industry must be defined so that the impact of imports on it can be assessed and the
domestic industry must be examined for signs of material injury or threats of such
• • 29
injury.
A preliminary injury investigation occurs after a case has been filed but before the
Department of Commerce has made a determination whether the alleged unfair practice
actually exists. In this preliminary investigation the International Trade Commission
decides whether there is a reasonable indication that the injury test can be satisfied. 30 If
subsidization is determined to exist the parties return to the International Trade
Commission for the final injury investigation. Here the injury test is applied more
stringently and the petitioner's standard of proof is higher. Injury investigations under
United States Law are not governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and they are
27 GATT Article VI, 55 U.N.T.S 1 87 art VI:6
28
International Trade Commission 50 Fed.reg. 25097, 25101
John Jackson, Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relations supra at 1 52
30
Tarrif Act 1930 Section703, 733; 19 U.S.C sec 1677
11
typically much less formal structured than proceedings before many other federal
regulating agencies'
3
.
D. The Agricultural Policies of the EC and US dealing with Subsidization
In the United States, strong political support for farm programs is a driving force
behind protectionism. Farm groups and agricultural industries have a powerful lobby in
congress and farm states have a strong voice in Congress. The US senate is structured so
that rural agricultural states such as North Dakota and Nebraska enjoy equal
representation with New York or California.
Agricultural liberalization is especially subject to legislative opposition in most
countries due to classic prisoner's dilemma. The US and EC are major players in the
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and they stand to benefit if the restrictions on
agricultural trade are removed . However if any of these countries is able to maintain
more of its protectionist policies than the other
,
producers in that country stand to gain
dramatically through increased exports and higher domestic prices. 33
The primary policy instruments that have been used to support agriculture are internal
price supports. The most common price support in the United States is the deficiency
payment which pays farmers the difference between a legislated target price and the
market price. There are also border restrictions such as tariffs, quotas, restrictive
31
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C 701-706 (1966)
32
Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and International relations Cheek to Cheek 19 N.C J lnt'1, L&
com. reg. 1, 12n.48(1993)
33
T.L Oyloe, US & EEC Agriculture 29 Span Progressive Agriculture 107, 108(1986)
Thomas L Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A threat to the GATT and Global Free Trade, 24 St
Mary's L.J 1165, 1185(1993)
12
licensing measures and export subsidies.^ The United States has programs subsidizing
wheat feed grains, rice, dairy, tobacco, sugar, oilseeds honey, wool and peanuts.
It must also be realized that US agricultural export gains have not kept pace with
increases in productivity. Export of farm products have remained relatively static since
1980. The percentage of Americans employed in agriculture has decreased from 6.7% in
1975 to 1.6% in 1993. 6 The resulting surplus has not been met by increases in
consumption or decreases in imports. Instead the US government has been forced to
either purchase unconsumed products or pay for their storage. Over the past ten years the
US Department of Agriculture has spent an average of 20 billion dollars per year on
agricultural programs.
The resultant inefficiencies and economic distortions further exacerbate the costs. One
study estimates that the US government spends over 80,000 dollars per year for each
farm job saved. Massive expenditures on agricultural support also shift resources from
unsubisdized to subsidized goods and from other sectors of the economy thereby
affecting labour and land allocation. Price supports and guaranteed income programs
create incentives to use land for agriculture which may otherwise be put to other uses. 38
On the other hand the benefits of trade liberalization are startling. Studies demonstrate
that developing countries stand to gain 26 billion dollars per year in real income through
trade liberalization and the United States could reduce its trade deficit by 42 billion
dollars.
39
35
id at 1179
36
Statistical Abstract of the US Census Bureau, 395 (1994)
37
Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables 40-42 (1995)
Thomas W Hertel, Economywide Effects of Unilateral Trade and Policy Liberalization in the US
Agriculture, in Macroeconomic Consequences ofFarm Support Policies 260, 261 (1989>
39
Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 Vand.L. Rev 809, 824 (1995J
13
In the European Community an important feature of agricultural subsidization has
been the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy for all member states. According to
the European Community Treaty40 the functioning and development of the Common
Market for agricultural products shall be accompanied by the establishment of a common
agricultural policy among the member states. The objectives of the Common Agricultural
Policy are:
a) To increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by ensuring
the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum utilization of the
factors of production in particular labour;
b) To ensure thereby a fair standard of living for the agricultural community: particularly
by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture;
c) To stabilize markets;
d) To guarantee regular supplies; and
e) To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
The Common Agricultural Policy has had dramatic success in increasing agricultural
productivity and assuring the availability of supplies. Although in the 1 960s Europe was
basically a food importer zone, today the EC is the second largest exporter of farm
products in the world. The scheme based on the use of variable levies to prevent imports
and exports refunds to foster exports proved to be very successful for the Community at a
time when it was a net importer of farm products. 41 The variable levy is a mechanism that
is designed to look like a tariff duty, but which effectively, operates as a non-tariff
barrier. It is a constantly adjusted tariff duty usually calculated based on the difference
between a desired domestic market price and the lowest world market price.42
The Common Agricultural Policy was established under the Treaty of Rome establishing the European
establishing the European Economic Community.
EC Treaty Article 39 (4) . 298 U.N.T.S 1 1, 30
41 Graham Avery, The Common Agricultural Policy: A Turning Point 21 Common Mkt.L.Rev,
481,482(1984)
42
Alan Charles Raul, Global Trade in Agricultural Products, 147 PLI Order No. A4-4276
14
Nonetheless the effects of this scheme on world markets has given rise to a growing
number of disputes between the community and the US. During the 1980s the
Community became a net exporter of agricultural products while a record number of US
farmers were filing for bankruptcy
.
4j
Although the causal relationship between the EC's
growing exports and the corresponding decline of US exports is much discussed the US
has blamed the EC for having stolen its markets. A war of subsidies and other
protectionist measures between the EC and the US has ensued becoming the most thorny
issue of the bilateral relationships between the two blocks.
44
A first step directed at restoring this credibility was the inclusion of agriculture within
the agenda of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 4? However the
irreconcilable differences between the EC and the US in connection with the reduction of
public support to farmers has stalled the talks, leading the negotiations to a halt.
E. The GATT rules on agriculture
The GATT rules dealing with agriculture were drafted to suit the interests of US
farmers. When the GATT was being formulated the US insisted that a provision should
be included which would permit the retention of quantitative restrictions related to the
enforcement of domestic agricultural programs. 46 Due to insufficient international
concessions to extend all of the rules governing trade in manufactured goods to trade in
agricultural products, exceptions were carved out so that the new rules and disciplines
43
id
Organization de Cooperation et de Development Economiques, Politiques Nationales et Echanges
Agricoles: Etude Sur la Cee 161 (1987)
45
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents GATT 19 (1987)
hereinafter BISD
46
Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization 1 st ed 10 (1970)
15
would not apply with full force in the area of agriculture. The GATT rules were
therefore written to fit the agricultural programs then in existence especially in the United
States.
48
For a number of reasons, agriculture has traditionally been a sector protected by most
governments. In the 1930s some western countries namely the United Kingdom. France
and Germany intervened heavily in agricultural markets to protect their farmers from the
crisis of the mid 1920s. The US also laid the foundations for its agricultural policies in
this period relying heavily on import quotas, production control programs . price supports
and export subsidies. 49
The regime established by the GATT in 1947 rests on four general principles: a) trade
ought be based on nondiscrimination and most favoured nation treatment, b) that non
tariff barriers should be eliminated, and c) that the GATT contracting parties should
adhere to bound duty rates and meet from time to time to negotiate the reduction of tariffs
and that disputes over trade should be settled primarily through consultation. 50 Article 1
of the GATT provides in part " any advantage
, favour
,
privilege or immunity granted
by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties". This article provides for the
uniformity in the tariff duties imposed by a GATT member country on all imports of a
particular item form all other GATT members." 1
47
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Article XI, 55 U.N.T.S 187 art XI: 2
48
Dale E Hathaway, Agriculture and the GATT : Rewriting the Rules 104(1987)
49
4 GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents at 1;61, T.I.A.S, No 1700
50
id
5/
General Agreement to Tariffs and Trade Article 1. 55 U.N.T.S at 641(1987)
16
Article XI of the GATT codifies the prohibition on non tariff barriers to trade. It
provides in part "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties , taxes or other charges
whether made effective through quotas , imports or export licenses shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party". Article XI provides for the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions. According to paragraph one of Article XI " No prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party"."
2 To the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions there is an
immediate exception applicable to agricultural products. According to paragraph two,
import restrictions may be allowed if they are necessary to the enforcement of any
governmental measures which aims to:
a) restrict the markets or production of a like domestic product; or if there is no
substantial domestic production of the like product of a domestic product for which the
imported product can be directly substituted;"^ or
b) to remove a temporary surplus of a like or directly substitutable product by making it
available to certain consumers either free or below the current price;"*'4 or
c) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal production where that
production is directly dependant on the imported product, if domestic production of that
product is small.
To prevent restrictions under these exceptions from being protectionist, any
contracting party who wishes to impose quantitative restrictions must give public notice
of either the total quantity or the value of the permitted imports of the specified product. 3
Contracting Parties have however found their way around these articles through illegal
J
" General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade Article XI, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol, IV,
p. 1 Geneva (1969)
53
id at art XI:2(a)
54
id at art XI:2(b)
17
quantitative restrictions. This takes the form of Voluntary Export Restraint agreements
or Orderly Marketing arrangements. They provide a level of access for a particular
country and once imports have reached this level further imports are excluded. In return
for this level of access the exporting countries usually agree not to export beyond the
individual quota for the importing country. Such measures help to protect domestic
producers.
36
Article XVI deals with exports of products with the assistance of subsidies. In relation
to export subsidies for agricultural products it declares that contracting parties shall seek
to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products. 3 If however a subsidy is
granted it shall not be applied in a manner which results in the party having more than an
equitable share of world export trade in that product because there are no statistical
definitions of an equitable share in world markets." The provision in this sense can be
exploited. This is due to the vagueness of the article and therefore contracting parties
bypass the GATT rules and impose on other contracting parties measures which are
contrary to the law and spirit of the GATT. There is therefore a conflict between
domestic agricultural programs on the one hand and the law of GATT on the other." 9
GATT prohibits export subsidies of non primary products for those contracting parties
that accepted Article XVI(4). 60
* id
56
Miguel Antonio Figuero, The GATT and Agriculture: Past, Present and Future 5 Kan.J.L& Pub.Pol'y 93
57
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 U.N.T.S 187art XVI
58
Jona Filipek, Agriculture ina World ofComparative Advantage 30 Harv.Int. L J 123,135 (1989)
59
id
On November 19, 1960 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark , France , Germany, Italy , Luxemborg, the
Netherlands, Norway
,
Switzerland
, the U.K, and the United States signed a declaration giving effect to
article XVI(4). E Bruce Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization 9 Va . Int .82, 91 (1968)
18
With regard to primary products the review session produced one of the most
ambiguous and criticized articles of the General Agreement : Article XVI(3) . According
to this provision the contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the
export of primary products. The article provides that "if a contracting party does grant
subsidies that operate to increase the export of any primary product from its territory
,
such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party
having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.
61 GATTArt.XVI(3)
CHAPTER 2
An Analysis of Protectionist Measures of the United States and European
Community
The Worldwide agricultural subsidies plus the cost to consumers resulting from
protectionist policies total about 150 billion dollars a year ". The Uruguay round of
Multilateral trade negotiations offered a means to reduce these costs and to enhance the
economic well being of agriculture.
In the addess by Clayton Yeutter. the Former Secretary of Agriculture to the United
States Feed and Grain Council he stated that many governments continue to protect their
domestic farmers with border measures which discourage or prevent import competition
from many commodities. This has led to an international system of competing subsidies
whose consequence is that poor nations unable to match the subsidies of their trading
partners are denied any realistic hope of agricultural development. 4
Due to the lack of enforcement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade it has
been necessary for contracting parties themselves to tackle the reduction of protectionist
activities in order for GATT to effectively encourage global trade in agriculture. In this
chapter I will detail the various forms of protectionist policies which have been in place
" B.T Oleson, Linkage ofAgricultural Policy and Long Term Prospects in Agriculture, 32 Can. J. Agric.
Econ. Rev 198(1985)
63 Mark Drabenstolt, Farm Policy Econ. Rev. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Publication (1989)
64
Address by Clayton Yeutter to the US Feed Grains Council Meeting. Aug 7, 1989.
19
20
markets. I will also explore the disadvantages of these policies and the various reforms
which have been made in an effort to meet the GATT obligations.
The main policies used by the United States and the European Community have been
domestic farm subsidies, agricultural export subsidies and barriers to agricultural imports.
These policies have been developed to assist farmers maintain farm income, stabilize and
market prices. 3
Each of these forms of protection has effects on domestic and international markets.
Domestic farm subsidies stimulate surplus production, which creates structural
imbalances in world markets. Export subsidies allow exporters to penetrate foreign
markets by selling at less than their cost of production. Beginning in 1985. the United
States created the Export Enhancement Program to compete with the EC. Under the EEP
the Department of Agriculture pays cash bonuses to US exporters equal to the difference
between US domestic price and world prices. 66 Both domestic and export subsidies
promote production efficiency and undermine the theory of comparative advantage.
In addition import barriers serve to insulate all or part of a domestic market from import
competition.
67
The US maintains import quotas on various agricultural products including
sugar and peanuts under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In 1992 US
import quotas on sugar increased the price of sugar to twenty two cents per pound or
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about twice the world price. Moreover this program of support costs US consumers about
3 billion dollars per year in high grocery bills.
Generally the US has been able to exert great influence over the international market
for agricultural commodities since the 1 970s. US domestic agricultural policy functions
as a constraint on other agriculture exporting nations, especially those in the developing
countries where trade tends to be agriculture dependent. Generally US farm policy offers
its farmers supplementary income through a variety of mechanisms to compensate for
domestic and international market forces that would not otherwise provide sufficient
income to justify continued production. Because US exports dominate the world market
for certain agricultural products. US farm policy has the potential to shape internal policy
and markets in developing countries, as well as export options and earnings power for
their agricultural sectors.
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A. United States Agricultural Production
The United States is a leading producer and exporter of major world food
commodities. The US produces about half of the world's corn and soybeans, and US
export comprise about sixty eight per cent of the World's total corn exports and almost
seventy three percent of the worlds total soybean exports. In wheat although the United
States produces only ten and one half percent of the world total, US exports make up
almost forty one percent of total world exports. Similarly, in cotton the United States
produces seventeen percent of total world production but supplies twenty eight percent of
{Catherine Monahan, US sugar policy: Domestic and International Repurcussions ofSour law, 15
Hastings int'l & comp I. rev 325, 343 (1992)
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the world exports. In rice, where domestic production is only one per cent of total world
production the high export rate of domestic rice leads to an eighteen percent share of total
world exports. Only in sugar is the US only two percent of world market. 71
Average US production and export of targeted commodities 1987-1989
US PRODUCTION AS % OF US EXPORTS AS %
WORLD PRODUCTION EXPORTS
67.8
28.4
18.6
72.7
2.2
40.6
COMMODITY I
OF WORLD
P
CORN 52.4
COTTON 17.2
RICE 1.4
SOYBEANS 48.3
SUGAR 5.9
WHEAT 10.5
FNSource: USDA Agricultural Statistics. 1990.
B. United States Farm Policy
United States Farm Policy focuses today less on farm incomes directly and more on
improving the US trade balance through expansion of exports in one of the most
productive sectors of the domestic economy. *" The United States has long employed
trade based programs to support farm incomes. The Agricultural Trade Development And
~
;
T. L Oyloe. U.S and E.E.C Agricultural 29 Span : Progressive Agriculture 107.108 (1986)
72
A.J Webb, World Agricultural Markets and U.S Farm Policy, published in Agricultural Economics: US
Department of Agriculture (1985)
23
Assistance Act was passed to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities and promote
the stability of domestic agriculture. It provided for sales of food commodities at market
prices to developing countries at highly conccesionary terms, in some cases granting up
to forty years for repayment as well as for outright grants of food aid. During the 1 960s
the program accounted for a large share of US agricultural exports but has declined in
importance in since the 1980s.
The effect has been that Food Aid has been particularly controversial because of its
mixed and uncertain effects on development. It has been denounced for causing a decline
in developing countries' local food prices through increased supply, thus discouraging
production, stifling development and increasing the long term need for food. On the
other hand food provided through the PL480 program may have made possible a stronger
commitment of resources to the industrial sectors in developing countries, thus spurring
industrial development. 75
The declining role of PL480 food aid program was precipitated by the passage of
additional export focused legislation to increase commercial sales. The Export Credit
Guarantee Program gives the US government guarantees of repayment to its exporters
when export sales are made on credit. Through this program when a domestic producer
sells to a foreign buyers, the government guarantees payment to the producer in the event
that the foreign buyer defaults. The program is designed to reduce the risk of export sales
73
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for US exporters. Domestic producers then may sell at lower prices than they could if
their buyer was not backed by the US government.
C. The Burden of Domestic Farm Programs in the US
Domestic farm programs have caused structural changes in the US. There are
approximately two million farms. Of these two about 1.6 million are smaller farms which
gross between 1.000 and 40.000 dollars per year. These farmers receive little government
support and do rely on farm revenues as their primary source of income. The average
annual farm income for this group of farmers is about $8,100 subsidies included, while
their off farm income is about 1 1,200. Most US government deficiency payments are
received by large relatively wealthy farm enterprises. Farm subsidization overwhelmingly
flows to about 363.000 farmers on the high end of the income scale who receive 30 per
77
cent of all farm subsidies.
D. Effects of Trade Liberalization
Though domestic farm jobs will be lost, employment in manufacturing will increase
through investment of savings gained through reallocation of resources away from
78
agriculture. Without pressure from subsidized products the market price for agricultural
goods will adjust upward and global demand will rise as developed countries shift their
resources away from agricultural production. As resources move away from agriculture
in developed countries they will shift toward agriculture in developing countries.
Increased agricultural production and exports in developing countries will yield more
76
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foreign exchange earnings, which will be available to purchase imports or repay debt.
Higher trade volume will facilitate reduction of imports tariffs and export taxes, which
will reduce distortions in domestic allocation of resources between agriculture industry.
Again these adjustment will promote higher demand for imports of industrial goods in
developing countries as the developed countries are looking to export more of these
goods, and greater supply of agricultural goods for export from developing countries as
80demand increases in the developing countries.
E. Border Measures of the European Community
Virtually all trading nations utilize some form of border restrictions to protect some
sector of domestic farming. Protectionist border measures include the use of prohibitive
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, variable duty rates and restrictive import licensing.
Q 1
unnecessary technical standards or unreasonable health and safety requirements.
One of the most effective forms of border restriction used by the EC has been the
variable levy system to limit imports of most major agricultural commodities. Through
the CAP the EC has managed to restrict import competition and to induce increased
production of its major agricultural items. The variable levy is a mechanism that is
designed to look like a tariff duty" . but effectively operates as a non tariff barrier. 82 It is
usually calculated based on the difference between a desired domestic market price and
the lowest world market price. Changes in world price are automatically reflected in the
William Dullforce. America's Farm Subsidies, The Economist . June 27. 1992 at 21.
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amount of the levy. As the price of import competition declines the levy applied to
imported goods rises , thus guaranteeing that domestic production, however high the
price, will maintain a competitive advantages over imports. The European Commission
calculates import levies for each grain on a daily basis.
8j The variable levy has been used
in conjunction with various types of internal subsidies to expand the EC's dairy , beef and
feed grains sectors with dramatic results. The CAP for dairy begun in 1962. resulted in
huge production and surpluses of skim milk powder and butter during the 1970s which
continued during most of this decade. These surpluses have only been recently arrested
by drastic changes in the program. Similarly the Common Agricultural Policy for feed
grains has transformed the EC from a large importer of feed grains to net exporter with
significant surpluses. It is plain, therefore that the result of the CAP system of which the
variable levy is a key component has been to induce ever increasing amounts of
production in the EC and to guarantee that most of that production is purchased within
the Community thereby displacing imported goods.
F. Price Support System of the CAP
Implementation of a system of guaranteed prices keeps market prices artificially high
for the benefit of Europe' s farmers. The EC farmer has incentive to over produce because
he is assured a guaranteed price per unit of his commodity. The CAP system of price
support is also protected from being undermined by imports. 86 To imported agricultural
products, the CAP assigns a minimum import price called the threshold price which
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constitutes the minimum entry price for imports from non EC states applicable at the
Community's external frontiers. 87 The threshold price is calculated so that the selling
price for imported commodities will be the same as the target price for community priced
agricultural products
88
. It is maintained at a level to prevent imports from undercutting
the target price by subtracting from the target price an amount which takes into account
the internal distribution costs of transport and unloading from the point of entry.
This is enforced so that European farmers are guaranteed a floor below which prices will
not fall.
90
If the internal market price falls to the minimum price level, intervention mechanisms
come into operation, but the form of intervention depends on the particular product.
Products may either be temporarily or permanently withdrawn from the internal market
by intervention agencies. When market price increases the agencies may re-introduce the
goods in the market or export them. '
G. Co-responsibility Levies
As budgetary outlays for the CAP continued to grow the EC devised a system of co-
responsibility levies which are payments made by Europe's farmers directly to the
Community, based on either a fixed rate of the price they receive or on a variable rate
according to the volume of commodity involved. " The original goal of this instrument
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was to reduce prices to farmers, raise revenue for the community and leave consumer
prices unchanged.
The price support systems have been so successful that structural surpluses have been
created in several products. As a result measures have been introduced to limit over
production within the community. In 1988 substantial reform in agricultural policy finally
occurred when the European Council agreed to introduce stabilizers that automatically
cut the EC guaranteed price for a commodity if agreed production levels are exceeded.
Stabilizers have now become an integral part of the Community's effort to curb
production. The premise is that a co-responsibility levy is charged at the beginning of
each marketing year and will only be reimbursed if the maximum guaranteed quantity is
not exceeded.
H. The Oilseeds Dispute
The various limitations of access to markets and protection of domestic markets
undoubtedly lead to trade disputes of which the most bitter and protracted has been
between the US and EC over oilseeds. In 1962 the US secured a zero duty binding for
oilseeds from the EC during the Dillon Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 94
Consequently, the US export of oilseeds could enter the EC duty free, a practice which
the US would like to see continue. The zero binding was granted because Europe needed
protein feed components for its rapidly expanding meat sector, and the US, the world's
Eva Basile, The General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, the European Economic Community and
Agriculture, Tul. L. J 1993
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largest producer of such products, was the EC's principle supplier of oilseeds and oilseeds
products.
Four years later the Community desiring to bring the oilseed sector under CAP,
formulated a system of minimum producer prices and a system of subsidies for oilseed
processors to ensure that preference were given to domestically produced oilseeds.
Initially the impact on US producers was minimal but by 1987 the US's anxiety over the
use of domestic subsidies by the Community to erode the advantage of the 1962 zero
duty binding had peaked. 96
In 1987 the American Soybean Association filed a section 301 petition with the
United States Trade Representatives as permitted by the United States Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act. This alleged among other things that the EC's acts, policies and
practices concerning oilseeds were denying the rights allotted to the United States under
GATT and were imposing a burden on restriction upon US commerce. The Claim was
that subsidy payments made to EC processors for processing EC oilseeds, but not foreign
oilseeds violated Article 111:4. The USTR initiated an investigation and later initiated
consultations with the community as required by Article XXVIII of the GATT. Those
negotiations failed and the US requested that the GATT Council of Representatives
establish a dispute settlement panel. The newly established panel found that the EC's
oilseed subsidies impaired benefits accruing to the US under the duty free tariff bindings
on oilseeds granted by the Community to the US."
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In 1990 the EC Council of Ministers adopted a new oilseed subsidy scheme linked to
direct payments to producers based on a per hectare basis. The GATT Panel
recommended that the Community move more expeditiously to remove the impairment
by either modifying its oilseeds support system or renegotiating EC tariff concessions for
oilseeds under Article XXVIII of the GATT. In 1992 at a GATT Council meeting the
Community indicated it was not amenable to either action. 100
The US sought compensation under article XXVIII and the USTR threatened to
impose punitive tariffs on a billion dollars worth of EC agricultural products into the US.
a figure equivalent to the burden or restriction imposed upon US commerce by EC
oilseed subsidies. The Community only offered the US 400 million dollars in
compensation and later refused to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. 101
After seven years the Blair House Agreement was signed . First the Community
agreed to permanently limit the level of subsidized oilseed production and in exchange
the US withdrew its threat to impose 200 per cent punitive tariffs. Second, it dealt with
agricultural subsidies, the main stumbling block of the Uruguay Round. Domestic
Subsidies on all agricultural products will be reduced by 20% based upon the average
level of production as determined by the Aggregate Measure of Support. While the
curtailed level of domestic subsidies did not necessitate the granting of concessions by
the community this was not true as far as export subsidies were concerned. 102
On December 14, 1989 the GATT Panel released its report finding that community
regulations providing for payments to seed processors conditional on the purchase of
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oilseeds originating in the community are inconsistent with .Article III of the General
Agreement 1(b . According to this article imported products shall be given treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to domestic products. This applies to all regulations
affecting their internal purchase.The GATT Panel recommended that the community
bring these regulations into conformity with the General agreement.
104
Secondly, benefits
accruing to the US under Article 1 1 of the General Agreement in respect of the zero tariff
binding for oilseeds were impaired.
1(b
This resulted from the introduction of production
subsidy schemes which operate to protect community producers of oilseeds. Tollowing
the release of the report the EC foreign affairs council expressed its readiness to accept
the GATT panel's conclusions and to adapt the community regulation within the
framework of the implementation of the results of the Uruguay round. t
Another trade dispute resolved earlier was the dispute regarding the subsidized export
of sugar and the claim was filed by Brazil and Australia. In the Sugar Subsidy Case the
EC's price support program for sugar held the domestic price of EC sugar well above
world market prices. The high support price stimulated production above the level of
domestic consumption creating a surplus that had to be exported each year. The high
domestic price necessitated a substantial export subsidy in order to meet world prices. At
times the subsidy amounted to twice the world price. 107 The EC share of the world
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market had risen from 8.8 per cent prior to 1976 to 14.3 per cent in 1978. This 75 per cent
increase in the EC market share had been achieved through the use of export subsidy. 108
I. Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
As a result of the dispute and the negative effects of the Common Agricultural Policy
the European Commission decided to reform it. The CAP had been overwhelmingly
successful but there were several drawbacks. By boosting output too successfully it had
generated surpluses that were costly to store. It infuriated farmers too by not propping up
their income as much as they would like. 109 By the mid 1980s policy makers realized
that the CAP desperately needed reform due to changes in the European economy and the
failure to achieve the policy's stated goals. The cost of the agricultural program was
skyrocketing. Annual Farm subsidies cost approximately 46 billion in 1992, representing
56% of all EC spending for the year. In 1991 the EC Commission estimated that the cost
of the CAP would exceed the budget ceiling of approximately 39 billion dollars. 110
During the 1980s the imbalance between supply and demand caused a buildup of
surpluses and a heavy drain on the EC's budget.
The movement for reform of the CAP began as early as 1985 with Commission's
issuance of a Green Paper." ' It reported that the CAP has failed to provide adequate
support for farmers because the existing system did not take adequate account of the
incomes of the vast majority of small and medium size family farms. This had resulted in
enormous income disparity among farmers in various member states and within the
109
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member states. 1 12 The Commission decided that progressive reductions in production of
surplus sectors by means of a price policy reflecting market demand should be engaged.
This should take into account the income problems of small family farms in a more
effective and systematic manner, supporting agriculture in areas where it is indispensable
while maintaining social balance and protecting the environment.
In May 1992 the EC adopted reforms of which the main thrust has been to switch
from a price support policy to one geared more towards direct aid for producers, at the
same time taking account also of growing concerns over the social and economic
development of rural areas" 4 . The reforms were phased over a three year period, the
goals of which are a better balance of agricultural markets, both through more effective
control of production and through keener efforts to stimulate demand. l ~ Another goal
was to make more competitive. European agricultural products on the domestic and
international markets was to be achieved through substantial price reductions.
In an attempt to control the markets. European legislators focused on four objectives
when making adjustments to the CAP: control of production and expenditure, reduction
of stocks, preservation of the European pattern of agriculture and international concerted
action.
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The Macsharry Plan would allow the target price for cereals to fall by 35% over three
years and the intervention price would be 10% below and the threshold price and 10%
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above the target price. 11 In 1992 the Council of Agricultural Ministers formally adopted
the policy which would over three years control production while guaranteeing fanners'
1 I Q
income. This called for price cuts, measures to control over production, and a link
between subsidies and acreage. This has represented a step in the right direction but it by
no means represents a fundamental change in the CAP policies. The effect of the 1992
policy has been that the level of price support for most agricultural products have been
reduced.
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CHAPTER 3
Analysis of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations
From the analysis above it is observed that agricultural protectionism has hampered
trade in agricultural products as the EC and US have sought to protect their domestic
markets. Disputes have occurred as a result of agricultural subsidization and there has
been the need for constructive steps to reduce subsidies. The essence of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Agreements was to establish steps to reduce restrictive activities
and encourage trade liberalization. The Uruguay Round brought trading in agricultural
products under the umbrella of GATT. The GATT Code of rules under the Uruguay
Round Became applicable to all products whether or not a tariff concession had be
granted on them. It is interesting to observe that the United States did not initially
favour the decision to bring all agricultural products within the confine of the non tariff
system as it wanted to continue to protect its agricultural market. In this chapter I will be
analysing the elements of the Round which have made significant steps to reducing
protectionism. Although these steps are designed to promote freer trade they still have
loopholes which can be exploited in the aim to secure restrictions to market entry.
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A. An introduction to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
At the start of the Uruguay Round the effects of protectionism was being felt in the
global agricultural trade. Between 1980 and 1985 world farm trade decreased by about
1 1%. During that period. United States farm exports fell from a record level of 43.3
billion to 26.1 billion dollars while farm exports from the European Community from
29.1 billion in 1981 to 26.1 billion in 1986. Thus the US. once the world largest exporter
of agricultural products was now watching its share of the world market decline than its
main competitor. *
The Uruguay Round Agreement contains four parts, one on modalities for the
establishment of specific binding commitments under the Reform Program, another on
the decision by contracting parties on the application of Sanitary and Photo-sanitary
measures, and one on the declaration on measures concerning the possible negative
effects of the Reform Program on net food - importing developing countries.
It contained specific binding commitments in three important areas- market access,
domestic support and export competition. It took into account the distinctive problems of
developing countries, especially the least developed countries. Article IX provides a list
of export subsidies which shall be subject to reduction commitments. This includes the
provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, consisting of payment in
kind, to a firm, industry, or producers of an agricultural product. "
The sale or disposal for export by governments, or their agencies of non commercial
stocks of agricultural products, at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the
120 RE Hudec. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. 2 nd ed 56 (1990 )
121 Jimmv Hillman, Agriculture in the Uruguay Round; A US perspective, 3 Till. L. J (1993)
122
id
123
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. IX, 55 U.N.T.S
like product to buyers in the domestic market is also subject to reductions. ~ The
implementation period was between 1993-1999. The contracting parties undertook not
to introduce or reintroduce subsidies on the export of agricultural products if such
subsidies were not granted during the base period. In addition they may negotiate
commitments to limit the scope of export subsidies granted on agricultural products in
individual or regional markets.
A proposal was made for the establishment of a committee on agriculture, charged
with the supervision of the operation of the agreement . The review process took place on
the basis of the notification submitted by the contracting parties and documents prepared
by the Secretariat. Consultations and dispute settlement will be governed by Articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement. 125
A third feature of the document is that it takes into account the special problems of
developing countries. Article 14(1) provides for special and differential treatment in
respect of commitments. Least developed countries are not required to undertake
reduction commitments. With regards to export competition developing countries will
not be required to undertake commitments in respect of some of the subsidies in Annex 7.
With respect to specific commitments in the areas of market access, domestic support and
export competition, developing countries will have the flexibility to apply lower rates to
reduction
.
provided that the rate of reduction in each case is no less than two thirds of
that specified for developing countries. In addition they will have an implementation
period often years. 126
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B. Analysis of the Round's Provisions of the Uruguay Round regarding trade in
Agriculture.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture modifies agricultural trade in three
principal areas. First, the agreement provides greater market access by bringing
agricultural products within the confines of GATT limits on non-tariff barriers. Second, it
bans all new export subsidies and establishes measures by which existing export
subsidies are reduced. Third, it requires reduction in domestic support by establishing an
aggregate measure of support for trade distorting domestic policies and by providing
timetables for specified cuts.
1-7
On December 15. 1993 parties to the Uruguay Round signed a Final Act embodying
the results of their trade negotiations. The multilateral agreement established a new world
trade organization known as the World Trade Organization (WTO) to administer the new-
multilateral trade system that emerged from the round and to oversee the implementations
of the substantive agreements reached in the Round. Under the Agreement on Agriculture
GATT Members would commit themselves to three basic measures : to provide greater
market access for agricultural imports, to reduce domestic farm subsides and to reduce
export subsidies.
a) Export subsidies
In Jeffrey Steinle's Article " The Problem Child of World Trade Reform** 129 he states
that prior to the Uruguay Round, GATT rules affecting agricultural trade were far weaker
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than those which governed trade in industrial goods. GATT Article XVI.4 "'provided
that contracting parties
"
shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any
product other than a primary product in which a subsidy results in the sale of such a
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product
to buyers in the domestic market."
Essentially, the WTO agreement on agriculture neither eliminates nor forbids exports
for agricultural products but rather it creates GATT bindings on the amount of export
subsidies that a country can provide. Article 2.3 of GATT ""provides that "members
shall not provide export subsidies in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity
commitment levels specified in its schedule and shall not provide such subsidies in
respect of any agricultural product not specified in the section of its schedules". Member
schedules are schedules calculated with reference to a formula of reductions of export
subsidies staged over a six year period, until the commitments reach levels 36 per cent of
budgetary support and 21 per cent in terms of export volume. The types of export
subsidies subject to reduction commitments are specifically listed in the text. No other
forms of export subsidies are permitted at all. Moreover other forms of subsidies or non
commercial transactions which might be used to circumvent export subsidy commitments
are forbidden bv Article X. 133
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b) Domestic support
With regard to domestic support Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 1,4
provides that a member shall not provide support in favor of domestic producers in
excess of the commitment levels in its schedule. The agreement does not eliminate
domestic support but rather implements a formula based approach to reductions. The
commitment is made on the basis of a Total Aggregate Measure of Support . The
Aggregate Measure of Support is the measure of the domestic subsidies provided by a
country for all agricultural commodities , except for support which is considered to have
no or minimal trade distorting effects, or for support which is tied to specific production
limiting policies.
It quantifies all forms of agricultural support and creates a composite figure used as
the basis for cutbacks.
13
" The AMS also forces countries to either effect the reduction of
local governmental outlays to agriculture or absorb the local outlays with greater cuts in
the central government's programs.
136
Countries must calculate AMS for each individual
agricultural product. The advantage of it is that it prevents production and trade
distorting countries from eliminating trade barriers in one product area by imposing them
in others. Countries are allowed to maintain agricultural policies that are more appealing
by making larger cuts in other less essential policies. The EU originally advocated AMS
for this specific reason. The United States, was opposed such a measure and instead
wanted to concentrate on the elimination of export subsidies. lj7 The AMS approach was
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ultimately adopted in the Uruguay Round and represents an important stride in breaking
down agricultural protectionism,
c) Market access
In seeking to provide greater market access for agricultural imports, the members
agreed to convert non tariff barriers into a tariff equivalent. In addition to subjecting non
tariff barriers to tariffication, the members are expressly prohibited from maintaining or
going back to any non tariff barrier that they were required to convert to a tariff
| TO
equivalent.
The market access provisions of the agreement mandate tariffication of all non tariff
border measures. Tarrification is the replacement of non tariff barriers with tariffs that
provide an equivalent level of protection. Tariff equivalents are equal to the difference
between the world market price and the domestic price with non tariff barriers in place. 1
The market access provisions require that members
shall not maintain, resort to , or revert to any measures of the kind which have been
required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.
The measures to be converted include quantitative import restrictions, variable import
levies, minimum import prices and discretionary import licensing. The conversion of non
tariff border restrictions to tariffs signals that agricultural products are no longer afforded
the myriad exceptions that are unavailable for manufactured goods. 140
The Agreement on Agriculture also requires that the tariff resulting after conversion of
non-tariff barriers be reduced. Tariff reductions are based on each country's tariff
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schedule, averaging a total of 36% over six years for developed countries. This higher
level of tariff reduction reflects the fact that developed countries account for about two
thirds of the world's import of agricultural products. Developing countries may reduce
their tariffs at a lower rate than developed countries. Scheduled tariff reductions for
developing countries average 24% over ten years. For individual tariffs, the minimum
reduction is 15%. limiting the extent to which a country may maintain protectionist
border measures for some products by reducing tariffs on others. The market access
requirement safeguards against trade decreases that could result if tariffication creates
greater protection than the original non tariff measure. The Agreement on Agriculture
does provide for safeguard measures that allow a member's imposition of an additional
duty on a product not to exceed one third of then current level, if it experiences a surge in
imports of that product. However these rules limit the use to one year and require a
1 J. 1
certain level of surge before an additional duty can be imposed .
1 -17
In Terrence McCarthys Article " he states that the increased market provisions with
the tarrification of all non tariff border measures will result in a binding on agricultural
products. As a result the security of trade in agricultural products will for the first time in
GATT's history be greater than in industrial products, as a hundred per cent of
agricultural product tariff lines will be bound. With respect to individual product
categories developed countries will cut tariffs by above average amounts on oilseeds, and
cut tariffs by below average amounts on sugar and diary products. In the category of
Alan C Swan, Cases and Materials on the Regulation ofInternational Business and Economic Relations
(\99A)
' Terrence McCartin, WTO Subsidies enforcement bv the US Department ofCommerce, 1075 Practising
L.J 613 (1998)
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tropical products, which accounts for half of the exports of developing countries in terms
of agricultural products, a 43% reduction in tariffs will be implemented. {A ~
Value of imports Percentage
reduction in tariff
Product categories
All agricultural products
Coffee, tea. cocoa
All sources Developing economies
84.240 38.030 37
9136 8116
Oilseeds, fats and oils 12.584 6833
Tobacco 3086 1135
Spices and cereal preparations 2767 1 134
Sugar 1730 1135
Grains 5310 725
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Source: GATT Secretariat. Agricultural Product Commitment for the Uruguay Round 144
Export Subsidy reduction commitments bv country
(Millions ofUS dollars)
Participant Export subsidies Product composition of export
subsidies
Total
coarse
Base Final Change
European Union 13.274 8496 -36 Bovinemeat ( 1 9%) ? Wheat ( 1 7%),
grains (13%), butter (13%).
143Md
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United States 929 594 -36 Wheat (61%) skim milk powder
(14%)
Source: GATT Secretariat: Reduction of Export Subsidies as a result of the Uruguay
Round.
REDUCTIONS IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS
Reduction in domestic support to agricultural producers
(millions of US dollars)
Participant Base Final
Change
European Union 92.390 76.903 -17
United States 23.879 19.103 -20
Source: GATT Secretariat
The market access provision on the other hand can be exploited to the detriment of
trade liberalization.This is due to the fact that tariffs can be overstated by individual
countries. The overstatement of tariffs has been labelled dirty tariffication. The
tariffication procedures used by a majority of countries resulted in significantly higher
tariffs than the estimated equivalent for the 1986-1988 base period. U:> The European
Union declared that tariffs were higher than the estimated equivalents for some products
and the United States has been known to have used dirty tariffication for some
products.
146
Dirty Tariffication also increases the likelihood that countries will use the
flexibility provided in reducing tariffs to minimize trade liberalization. Because
l4
\ GATT Secretariat, B.I.S.D 27th Supp 1994
l4i Vernon Runingen, Implication of Agricultural Policy Reforms in Industrial Market Economies 59
(1989)
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reductions are averaged across all products and are not trade weighted, an incentive exists
for countries to protect sensitive products through divergent tariff reductions,
d) Export competition
The Agreement on Agriculture imposes two major requirements on export subsidies.
Programs that constitute export subsidies include payments in kind, subsidized stock
exports, producer financed export subsidies, export marketing cost subsidies, and export
specific transportation subsidies. Nations are required to reduce their existing export
subsidies.
14
Export subsidy rules are important because they cap the future subsidies a
country may provide for an exported product. For the first time in the history of the
GATT there can no longer be any doubt as to what level of export subsidies a country can
grant in agricultural trade. To aid enforcement of these requirements the exporting
country has the burden of proving compliance with the reductions or prohibitions. 149 This
burden of proof should also compel governments to implement detailed reporting
procedures to establish that aid to producers is not tied to exports. The dual requirement
of reductions in budgetary outlays and export volumes is extremely important. If required
reductions in export subsidies are measured only by budget percentages, then as trade
increases, smaller subsidy expenditures can subsidize greater quantities of exports.
Conversely in a shrinking product market, if required reductions of subsidized exports are
measured only by volume, then greater expenditures could be applied without decreasing
the quantity of subsidized exports. 1 "
N
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C. Weakness and Enforcement Difficulties of the Provisions
The degree of trade liberalization afforded by the reductions in domestic support has
been significantly weakened by difficulties in enforcing the reductions. The first
difficulty is the effect of numerous exceptions within the agreement. The second is the
complexity of implementing the provisions and the political incentive for continuing
support. The third is the inability of the WTO to enforce the provisions in the agreement.
Green Box exceptions may also limit meaningful reduction of domestic support. Political
inertia also creates the incentive to preserve more trade distortive measures. Legislators
are concerned with the effects of disrupting employment in the agricultural sector by
cutting subsidies and politicians loathe to detract from farmers and upset the powerful
farm lobbies. 1 " 1 Also, there is a lack of reporting and verification procedures. Currently
there are no procedures in place by which a team of experts can audit agricultural support
programs of individual countries.
' Thomas Hertel, PSEs and the Mix ofMeasures to Support Farm Incomes. 12 World Econ. 17 22 (1989,/
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CHAPTER 4
Multilateral Trade Agreements and Developing Countries
This chapter discusses the effect of protectionist policies of the United States and
European Community on developing countries. The US and EC are the two major
markets which can pull developing countries out of balance of payments difficulties.
Increased access to these markets by developing countries in relation to the unrestricted
sale of agricultural products will encourage the development of third world economies.
Developing countries have had to forge special relationships with the US and EC in order
to obtain favourable market access. However this has been on the basis of discrimination
against other developing countries. The resulting effect has been the favouring of one
group of developing countries over another in breach of GATT principles.
It is important to emphasize that developing countries are economically small
compared to developed countries and their leverage in global negotiations is
correspondingly limited. In addition exports by individual countries are often
concentrated on a few product lines so that there is typically substantially more volatility
in developing country terms of trade compared to developed countries.
Developing countries have long felt that they had little influence in GATT decisions.
For many years developing countries pressed for special treatment in GATT and
attempted to create new rules to embody their concept of how the world economy should
47
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operate. In 1984 a GATT sponsored group of experts noted the adverse effect that non
tarrif barriers were having on developing country exports and called for their
reduction.
The General Agreement contains several provisions that explicitly allow differential
and more favourable treatment for developing countries. These provisions are Article
XVIII, XXVIII and XXXVIII. General clauses in the agreement also favour developing
countries. Article II requires GATT members to limit tariffs to the binding listed in the
schedule of that member. Many developing countries have historically had very short
schedules or no schedules at all and have been relatively free to use any level of tariffs
for any imported goods as they desire. Furthermore there is an important exception to
GATT rules for countries with balance of payment difficulties. Many developing
countries have chronic balance of payments difficulties and therefore have constant
access to the privileges of this exception.
15
A. The Decision on Most Favourable Nation Treatment. 3
Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
the contracting parties decided as follows:
a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General Agreement , contracting
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries
without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
1"
b) The provisions of paragraph 'a' apply to the following :
i. preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products
originating in developing countries in accordance the Generalized System of
Preferences,
1
" John Jackson World Trade and the law of GATT, Trade policies for a better future (Report of Eminent
Persons on Problems facing the International trading system.) 22 (1969)
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ii. differential and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the
General Agreement concerning non tarrif measures governed by the provisions of
instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
iii. regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less developed contracting
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and in accordance with criteria or
conditions which may be prescribed by the contracting parties for the mutual reduction or
elimination of non tariff measures on products imported from one another;
special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of
any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries,
c) Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause shall be
designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise
barriers or to create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties.
i. Any differential and more favourable treatment shall not constitute an impediment
to the reduction or elimination of tariff and other restrictions to trade on a Most Favoured
Nation basis;
ii. shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to
developing countries be designed and if necessary modified to respond positively to the
development , financial and trade needs of developing countries. 1 " 7
d. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of developing
countries .
B. The Generalized System of Preferences
The GATT contracting parties authorized the creation of the Generalized System of
Preferences by a waiver adopted in 1971 . The waiver was for ten years but the need to
extend it was eliminated by the 1979 GATT decision on differential and more favourable
treatment for developing countries. The idea was that the promotion of developing
countries' exports of manufactured products could help free those countries from heavy
dependence on trade in primary products , whose slow long term growth and marked
price instability contributed to chronic trade deficits. By adopting a deliberate policy of
export oriented industrialization, developing countries could benefit not only from
employment and production creation, but also from greater export earning potential based
156
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on products for which demand was strong.
1:>8 To attain these goals however only the
markets of the industrialized countries appeared large enough to provide the desired
growth stimulus.
The solution was the creation of a system of generalized non reciprocal preferences
under which developed countries would lower the customs duties they assessed on
goods imported from developing countries. It followed from that in addition to protection
in the home market.' developing country producers also needed preferential access to
developed country markets to offset their poor export prospects. This led to the
establishment of the Generalized System of Preferences which became a central element
in the call for special and differential treatment for developing countries in the GATT. 160
Through this approach producers in the developing countries would benefit from a price
advantage over other foreign producers whose goods would benefit from a price
advantage over other foreign producers, whose goods would continue to attract duty at
the normal rates. At the same time developing country producers would be able to
compete on more equal terms with domestic producers in importing countries. '
It has proved difficult to assess the actual effects of the Generalized System of
Preferences due to the unavailability of relevant statistics and the problem of isolating
the Generalized System of Preference from other factors influencing the overall growth
of developing countries .
Joseph McMahon, Agricultural trade, protectionism and the problems ofdevelopment 258 (1992)
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Under the GSP developing country benefits have been eroded by multilateral tariff
reductions under the GATT. Firstly, the GSP schemes impose quantitative and country
limitations. Also annual review by the President of the US results in annual country or
product exclusions. Secondly the system is frequently modified and lack the stability
needed for long term planning in developing countries. The EC modifies its ceilings and
quotas annually and hence may easily discontinue benefits. There are also numerous
exclusions in the provisions of the Generalized System of Preferences.
C. The Paradox of the Agreement on Agriculture
In Michelle Gravelle's article she states that although the Uruguay Round has made
significant inroads to promoting free trade there are negative effects arising out of it.
While the Uruguay Round aimed to liberalize trade by reducing protectionism, it on the
other hand made proposals which could be detrimental to the source of income obtained
by developing countries . The complex nature of trade liberalization is observed in the
light of concessionary agreements. On the one hand global trade will be advanced with
the limitation of restrictive policies. However on the other hand it is through similar
restrictive policies which has enabled many developing countries to obtain a constant and
guaranteed source of income. Trade liberalization therefore has to be carefully construed
1 f\A
in relation to developing countries. During the Uruguay Round there was a lot of
African participation and developing countries weakened their joint call for special
treatment in the system, and participated in ways which they previously had not.
" John Jackson, Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relations (1995)
Michelle Gravelle, Symposium : SocialJustice and Development- Critical issuesfacing the Bretton
Woods System. Africa and the Uruguay Round 6 Transnat'L&Contemp. Probs 123 (1996)
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According to the prevailing view the first potentially negative effect of the Uruguay
Round on African countries is preference erosion. The majority of African countries and
indeed nearly all the sub Saharan African countries, participate in various preferential
tariff schemes which give them margins of tariff preferences in their markets through the
Generalized System of Preference. In the European Community the GSP is supplemented
by the Lome Convention. l6 ~ These preferences allow a reduced tariff rate to apply to
exported products from qualifying African Caribbean and Pacific countries, creating a
benefit for these qualifying countries. Preference erosions resulting from the Uruguay
round produces trade losses of about 7.5million dollars, with a loss of about 5.4million
occurring in the EU. 166
A second potentially negative effect identified in the debate over the effects of the
Uruguay Round on Africa is the effect on the food importing countries which include a
number of African countries. Here the contention is that as a result of the new disciplines
agreed to in the Uruguay Round there will be a reduction in the levels of support paid to
farm communities in the industrialized states, particularly in Europe. As a result
agricultural food prices will rise globally, reflecting reductions in production subsidies -
covering both explicit production subsidies, price supports, and export subsidies. Mam-
view these arrangements and subsidies as the reason for increases in supply and relatively
low food prices for net food importing countries. The contention is that agricultural
Jack Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO can heal the split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute 63
Fordham.L.Rev 1283(1995)
3
John Jackson. Problems ofInternational Economic Relations 1 130-3 1 (1990); 29 I.L.M 783
Peter Madden, Winners and Losers: The impact ofthe GATT Uruguay Round on Developing countries.
(1993)
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production in key exporting countries will fall, export subsidization will be reduced and
there will be a global increase in food prices.
Another contention is that the extent of agricultural liberalization in the Uruguay
Round has been relatively small and the tarrification process in some cases has actually
resulted in increased trade barriers for certain products in certain markets. The argument
is that along with agricultural liberalization in the developed countries comes agricultural
policy discipline in developing countries, which will improve their situation through the
elimination of domestic price distortions and changes in domestic pricing
arrangements.
168
D. The Lome Convention
The Lome Convention is a multilateral trade agreement which provides preferential
treatment for African. Caribbean and Pacific countries. Tariff preferences agreed upon
are a central feature of the Lome convention and there are protocols for products which
include rice, sugar, beef. veal. rum. and bananas. The concessionary arrangement under
the Lome Convention are important for particular African Countries. Under these
arrangements a quota operates under which beneficiary countries ship limited amounts of
products into European markets for which they receive close to domestic prices in
Europe, which often nearly double the world prices.
In the case of sugar the EU undertakes to purchase specific quantities of cane sugar
at guaranteed prices. Under Protocol 7 to the Lome Convention import duties other than
customs duties, applicable to beef and veal originating in the ACP countries are reduced
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 33 I.L.M 1 144(1994;
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by ninety per cent. The reduction in import duties applies to exports to the EU of
specified quantities of boneless meat per calendar year for several African Countries.
17
The Lome Convention departs from the principle of reciprocity which has been a
hallmark of the earlier agreements. There are no requirements for reverse preference in
the Lome Agreement. Products originating in the ACP states including manufactured
goods and textiles enter the community free of customs duties and in most instances
quantitative restrictions.
171
Certain agricultural products are excluded consistent with
EEC Common Agricultural Policy .' /2Quotas have been extended for ACP beef and veal
with an increase of almost 25% over Lome III allowances. Quotas for bananas, sugar, and
rum are also in place designed to protect traditional markets for the ACP suppliers of
these products. Mechanisms are also available for the admission of certain important
agricultural products such as strawberries, tomatoes, molassess and sorghum, particularly
during the off-season in Europe. Where the CAP imposes a duty, but no quantitative
i -7->
restriction on agricultural import. ACP products are duty free. Notwithstanding the
very liberal provisions for ACP exports to the Community, the trend in ACP /EEC trade
has been negative. There has been a decline of EEC imports from all developing
countries from 20% in 1975 to 15% in 1987. 175
The introduction and gradual extension of the Community's General System of
Preferences has considerably eroded ACP preferences. Indeed only about a third ofACP
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products, primarily agricultural produce and fish enjoy real advantages due to the Lome
preferences. The remaining two thirds would enter duty free in any event. ACP countries
must compete with other developing countries in the EEC markets for these GSP
products. The ACP countries have made the Community comply with article XXIX in
the Lome IV. noting that it is conscious of the need to ensure the overall application of
the convention and the maintenance of the competitive position of the ACP states where
their advantages to the Community market are affected by measures relating to general
trade liberalization.
176
E. The Banana Trade War
The Banana Dispute illustrates protectionism by both the United States and the
European Community and how the principles of GATT have been breached in the
achievement of protectionist measures. It is interesting to note that both the EC and US
do not have any significant interest in Africa in particular but are protecting the markets
for their respective multinational corporate clients.
Since 1988 the EC has been the world's largest importer of bananas credited with
nearly 40% of the global banana market. In 1991 the cumulative volume of fresh bananas
in the EC neared 3.63 million tons of which Latin American countries produced two
thirds of the total. In 1992 the total supply of bananas in the EC market approximated
3.76 million tons of bananas of which Latin American countries provided 2.4 million
tons and ACP countries provided around 0.69million tons. 177
Fifty First Session ofthe ACP Council ofMinisters: Seeking satisfaction on Trade, The Courier no 125
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In 1993 the European Union after five years of procrastination made an attempt at
settling what had become a complex and thorny issue of how to regulate the banana trade
in the Union. The problem was that some members imported bananas solely from their
former colonies in order to guarantee those developing countries a market for their
bananas. Meanwhile other countries who were not bound to former colonies bought
cheaper bananas from Latin American producers who had modern and cost efficient
bananas industries.
17
Germany had unimpeded access to bananas under the treaty of Rome and the Lome
Convention also guarantees territories and former colonies preferential treatment with
regard to their banana exports. The EU obligations under GATT meant that the
contracting parties, including the five Latin American banana countries would be given
most favored nation status in regards to trade with the EU. GATT therefore obligated the
EC to deny preferential treatment to any country at the expense of Latin American
179
countries.
The effect of this would be that ACP countries economies would be displaced and
hundreds of thousands ofjobs would be lost. This would be devastating to a lot of the
ACP nations whose main source of income is derived from the trade in bananas.
However the EU agreed to new banana import rules that took effect in 1993. It reconciled
regulating the banana market while at the same time honoring its commitment to the
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that banana exports would be protected. The
result was a new banana regime that uniformly enforces all tariffs and quotas throughout
Europe. In order to honour its commitments to the ACP banana producing countries, the
178
European Council Regulation 404/93, art 12, 1993 O.J (L47)
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new regime allows duty free importation up to 30% of all European banana consumption.
Latin American bananas on the other hand which are cheaper are limited to two million
1 80
tons per year with a 20% tariff. Anything above this level is subject to 170% tariff.
This measure was to prevent devastation of the AC? economies which heavily rely on the
European banana market.
The Latin American Countries reacted to the new regime. They called on GATT to
implement a dispute panel to investigate and rule on the legality of the new banana
regime. The Latin American countries argued that the EU"s banana regime was
incompatible with GATT and discriminatory.
In an attempt to head of the GATT panel report the EU made the Latin American
countries a compromise offer. The offer consisted of a 100,000 ton increase in 1994 and a
200,000 ton increase in 1995 over the original two million annual quota. The offer was
non negotiable and conditional on the Latin American producers dropping the ongoing
GATT dispute prior to release of the Second Panel report. However some of the countries
refused and the compromise dissolved.
The second report criticized the EC who argued that the report was unacceptable due
to the dire political and economic consequences it would cause the ACP countries if the
EU opened its market to less expensive Latin American Bananas. It argued that its
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commitments to the ACP countries under the Lome Convention do not permit it to turn
its back on the ACP countries. 182
1. The African Caribbean and Pacific countries
These are sixty nine in number. These countries' trade with the EU is governed by the
Lome Convention. The EU grants them preferential trading status due to their former
colonial status. For most of these developing nations this arrangement is important to
their economic and political survival. Of these sixty nine countries at least eight
Caribbean and African countries are considered to have significant banana producing
industries. They are Belize, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada, Jamaica. Cote
dTvoire, Cameroon and Somalia. Prior to the new banana regime 46% of the bananas
consumed by the EU came from ACP and EU territories but under the new regime this
1 o }
figure has dropped to 30%.
2. The Latin American countries
These countries have industrial efficiency in banana production. Compared to the
ACP countries they have larger farms and lower costs of production. The banana
producing countries are Columbia, Venezuela. Costa Rica. Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Honduras. Panama and Ecudor. Of these eight the first five are GATT members and the
primary source of income and economic stability are derived from bananas. However the
disparity of Latin American production costs with the ACP is due to capital investments
by multinational corporations from the United States in the Latin American Banana
Industry. Due to the significant investment and the traditional presence of those
59
multinationals. Latin America plantations are much larger than those of the ACP and
significantly more efficient. Consequently the cost of production is considerably less.
3. The United States involvement
Until September 2. 1 994 the United States had refrained from entering the banana war.
At that time. Chiquita Brands International Inc. and Hawaii Banana Industry Association,
two major American owned multinational enterprises, filed a petition under Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act with the United States Trade Representatives. Section 301
authorizes the executive branch to retaliate against practices of another country that are
considered unfair in trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting US interests and
those of its nationals. United States nationals may petition the government to initiate
investigatory proceedings of a country's trade practices under Section 301 . Many foreign
countries have strongly criticized section301 because the President through the USTR
may retaliate even where there is no showing that the alleged offense violates any
international agreement. Additionally. U.S officials may impose these sanctions without
any regard to the GATT/WTO authorities or to US international obligations. Section 302
(a) of the Trade Act authorizes the USTR to investigate acts, policies and practices of a
foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminator) and burden or restrict US
commerce as defined in section 301.
The US cited GATT Article 1:1 as a prohibition against the EC's duty free treatment
of non traditional ACP bananas. Article 1 was also cited as a prohibition against
182
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discrimination. The US rested its challenge on Article XIII which covers non
discriminator}' administration of quantitative restriction. This article generally mandates
that a GATT member which justifiably employs tarrif quotas may do so provided it does
not administer the quota scheme in a discriminatory manner. " In its brief to the WTO
the US asserted that the EC 's tarrif quota offended the equitable market access
distribution principle. In support of its argument the US stated that while Article XIII
does not prevent a country from providing allocations to countries that do not meet the
substantial interest criteria, it underscores that any quota allocations must conform with
reasonable expectations that GATT members would have regarding their market shares in
the absence of such import restrictions .
The US claimed that the EC's actions has injured American banana marketing
companies by undermining their ability to obtain the market share they enjoyed prior to
the regime. The US attributed this diminution of access into the EC market to
discriminatory treatment of Latin America Banana producing countries in favour ofACP
countries. However the US, despite its array of legal allegations does not fully have
standing in a dispute. It seems that the US's sole objective was to secure the continued
profitability of American multinationals and had no legitimate concerns for the Latin
American nations involved.
In 1994 Chiquita Brands International. Hawaiian Banana Industry Association and
Dole Foods who produce
,
distribute and market bananas through their US incorporated
parent companies or through their owned and controlled subsidiary entitites summoned
Canute James, U.S Position on EC Banana Quotas Angers Leaders ofCaribbean Nations, J. COM .,
July 1993
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the US government's intervention by alleging their inability to handle the same or larger
volume of bananas for marketing and distribution services as a result of the EC banana
import regime.
187 On the basis of the violations the United States alleged against the EC,
the US under its own laws, must demonstrate that it has interest in the assertion of its
legal right to seek redress for the alleged wrong. In doing so it must show that it has
suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact as a result of the EC banana
regime. 188 US firms undeniably suffered injury but relief must not be sought under the
cover of restrictions against Latin American countries. The injuries to which the United
States point undoubtedly affect US based parent firms and US owned subsidiaries in
Latin America and Europe that engage in the production, distribution and marketing of
Latin American bananas to the EC market. According to Article I. the rights that arose
out of negotiated trade concessions in bananas correspond to those countries that not only
produce bananas but also export them from within their territory. The EC irrefutably
injured the banana trade expectations of these Latin American countries by failing to
afford the bananas which originated in these territories treatment as favourable as
accorded to other GATT and non GATT members. Therefore the Latin American third
countries are each logical claimants to injury resulting from a violation that impairs their
ability to export their home- grown bananas.
The injuries alleged by these third countries are entirely different from the injuries the
United States alleges its firms' marketing and distributing services incurred. The United
States is not complaining about its restricted ability to produce and export US grown
186
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bananas and so it cannot rely on the protection of Article 1 of GATT. In effect its claim
of injury' resulting from an infringement on its ability to export bananas grown in a
foreign territory is misplaced. From this perspective the United States does not have
standing to seek relief for injuries that US firms suffered under GATT in terms of trade in
goods.
4. Recent developments in the Banana Trade dispute.
Although the United States did not have legal standing it got a go-ahead to impose
100% tariffs on 200 million dollars worth ofEU imports on April 6. 1999. The WTO
decision on European Union banana import rules was seen as a major victory that could
set precedent in other trade disputes. US trade officials said a WTO arbitration panel
agreed with the US that new EU banana import rules violate international trade laws. But
the panel significantly lowered the amount of sanctions sought by the US in the case. The
United States originally claimed $520 million in lost trade due to EU banana rules. The
EU is the biggest banana market, estimated to be worth five billion dollars a year at the
retail level.
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The United States won a trade dispute which had not been about the effect of quota
restrictions on banana producing economies but rather a trade war in the interest of the
various multinational companies who trade in the product. Chiquita Brands international,
for the nine months ended October 30. 1998. net sales increased 14% to 2.09 billion
dollars. Net income applicable increased 61% to 70.3 million dollars. Revenues reflect
190
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the expansion of the vegetable canning operations through acquisitions. This is a
company that employs 40.000 people with a market cap of 674.66 million dollars. 191
Similarly. Dole Food Company is engaged in the worldwide distributing, processing.
sourcing and marketing of growing branded good products including fresh fruits.
vegetables, and almonds. For the forty weeks ended October 10, 1998 revenues rose 4%
to 3.39 billion dollars. It employs 44.000 and has a market cap of 1.729.10million
dollars.
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CONCLUSION
The global trade in agricultural products has over the years been subjected to trade
policies which have been restrictive in nature.The predominant agricultural markets have
been that of the United States and European Community. They account for two thirds of
the total global trade in agriculture. The United States and the European Community have
had border measures which have inhibited the progress of agricultural trade. These border
measures have been utilized to protect their respective domestic markets. Methods have
included variable duty rates and quantitative restrictions.
Protectionist trade policies have not only been economically detrimental but have been
in violation of the GATT rules. The principles of GATT were enacted in international
law to promote free trade in agricultural products but some of the principles involved
have been disregarded in the desire to protect domestic markets.Over the years the United
States and the European Community has engaged in several protectionist conducts which
has lead to the principles being rendered ineffective.
Developing countries are economically smaller than developed countries and their
ability to negotiate effectively for their regions has been limited. Although developing
countries have had access to non reciprocal Most Favourable Nation Treatment they have
encountered trade restrictions among which are variable levies and quantitative
restrictions.
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The effect of protectionism by the United States and Europe on developing countries
has been that trade in agricultural products from developing countries has not been
extremely progressive. Instead we have seen the violation of GATT rules through illegal
discrimation of one group of developing countries against another. Policies of the United
States and Europe have therefore hindered the growth in world trade.
The reforms instituted by the Uruguay Round Agreement have been very important in
the aim to liberalize global trade in agriculture. The Uruguay Round has reduced the
growth of agricultural protectionism. The market access and export subsidy provisions
have provided means to reduce protectionist measures in the agricultural trade. The
United States and European Union should continue to reduce restrictive and protectionist
practices which stifles the advancement of trade and instead redirect its resources to
promoting efficiency in the global trade in agricultural. With the full compliance of the
Uruguay Round Agreements protectionist trade policies will be limited and economic
prosperity will be available for all.
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